This article contributes to the ongoing debate on native wage impacts of immigration. I propose a mobile-fixed factor distinction as a framework in which to think about the differential impact of immigration on various labor market groups. Skilled workers are treated as a fixed factor of production since the strong reliance on skill certification in Germany inhibits mobility and shelters from competition. Unskilled workers, in contrast, receive competitive wages. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for 1984-1989 I estimate panel wage regressions for groups of workers separated by skill certification. I find that university graduates? wages increase, and the wages of workers without postsecondary degree decrease, as the industry share of unskilled workers increases. The effect for apprentices is ambiguous.
Introduction
In this article I address the following question: How does the share of unskilled workers in one industry affect the wages of unskilled and skilled workers in that particular industry? I perform an empirical investigation using data for West German workers during the second half of the 1980's. Knowledge of the answer will contribute to two, seemingly unrelated, current debates in empirical labor economics. i) Do native workers benefit or suffer from immigration?
ii) Why does the apprenticeship system apparently function so well in Germany?
While the first issue has been extensively discussed in the context of the US labor market, the evidence for Germany, de-facto one of the main European immigration countries during the last decades, is recent and still unsettled. Relevant papers are Zimmermann (1993, 1994) , and Pischke and Velling (1994) . DeNew and Zimmermann (1994) start from the working assumption that "immigrants tend to be substitutes for low-qualified natives" (p. 178). They find that immigration provides small gains for high-skilled workers (defined as white-collar workers) and large detrimental effects for low skilled workers (those with blue-collar status). DeNew and Zimmermann (1993) find that the hardest hid segment within the blue collar workers is the group of foreign workers. In contrast, Pischke and Velling (1994) , performing an analysis based on local labor markets, find no evidence for negative wage or employment effects due to immigration. Similarly, Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1994a,b) find no immigration effects in Austrian data.
In this article, I provide additional evidence on the issue. I use the same data source and a similar methodology as Zimmermann (1993, 1994) but I modify their analysis in two important respects. Firstly, I use the fact that the German labor market relies heavily on certification of skills. Certification takes the form of university degrees, and, more importantly, vocational degrees. Thus, it seems natural to define as unskilled those who do not possess any certified skill, and as skilled those who have obtained some post-secondary degree. In this definition, skilled worker status is not based on current labor market position but rather solely on the amount and type of training a worker has received. For the study of labor market effects of immigration, discrimination by skill certificates appears to be a much better approach than discrimination by current occupational status, both in terms theoretical content and measurement quality.
Secondly, I circumvent the problem of distinguishing between immigrants and foreigners. While one would like to measure the first, data are available only on the latter.
The two measures differ since under current German citizenship laws second generation immigrants frequently remain foreigners, while in terms of labor market performance they can be expected to differ little from natives. By establishing instead the effect of increases in unskilled labor without making arbitrary assumptions at the estimation stage, one can then predict the effect of immigration under various assumption on the skills of immigrants, one of them being that they are entirely unskilled.
Furthermore, the link between unskilled labor and skilled workers' wages may provide insight into the second question, why the German apprenticeship system apparently functions so well, one indication being the broad support it enjoys both among labor unions and employers (Steedman, 1993) . Assume that apprenticeship certification allows workers to obtain skilled worker status and that skilled workers' wages increase with the amount of unskilled labor. In this case, an increase the amount of unskilled workers in the economy is in the interest of skilled workers. The obvious way of achieving this increase is through immigration. In this framework, immigration is welcomed by native workers, most of whom are skilled, and by capitalists alike. Immigration might have been instrumental in maintaining high post-apprenticeship wages during the last decades.
In this article, I use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel to provide an empirical investigation into the link between the quantity of unskilled workers and skilled workers' wages. Firstly, however, I will outline a theoretical background that will help in the interpretation of the findings.
Skilled Worker's Wages as a Rent
The relation between wages and employment has traditionally been analysed in a production function framework where different types of labor (for instance, skilled and unskilled) are treated as distinct inputs and where real wages equal marginal products.
Cross wage elasticities are then determined by the underlying production technology.
Two factor are q-substitutes if an increase in the supply of one input lowers the price of the other input, and q-complements if the increased supply raises the other input's price. The technology may be modelled explicitly, taking into account the appropriate cross-equations restrictions (as, for instance, in Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994) ), or underlie a reduced form approach as in Zimmermann (1993, 1994) .
I will explore an alternative framework which conforms more closely to the strong reliance of German labor market institutions on certified skills and which does not require wages to equal marginal product. The basic idea is that skill certificates introduce specificity that prevents occupational mobility of skilled workers in the short run. Hence, skilled labor is an immobile factor of production and has to be treated as fixed. Unskilled workers, in contrast, have little or no occupation specific human capital and are, therefore, more mobile. There is ample evidence that the German labor market contains substantial barriers to mobility for skilled workers. A detailed account of the impermeability of the German system is given in Hamilton and Hurrelmann (1994) . Specificity is introduced through curricula and skill certification, and perpetuated in collective bargaining agreements that define job profiles and skill requirements. Hamilton and Hurrelmann point out that employment in most of the close to 400 apprenticeship occupations is legally reserved for certified completers.
The theoretical consequences of this assumption can be laid out in a simple two sectortwo factor model. There is a fixed amount of skilled labor employed in sectors A and B. Unskilled workers (that is workers without occupation specific training) can move freely between the two sectors. The labor market equilibrium is given in Figure 1 .
-----------Insert Figure 1 about here -----------Firms hire unskilled workers up to the point where the wage rate equals their marginal product. Any unskilled worker wage differential between the two sectors is eliminated through labor mobility. Unskilled workers move from the low wage sector to the high wage sector even in the short run. If the total amount of unskilled labor is ON 0 , then OE 0 workers are employed in sector A, while E 0 N 0 workers are employed in sector B.
Their wage is w 0 . Skilled workers receive the rent, that is the value of total production minus the wagebill paid to unskilled workers. The rent corresponds to area ABw 0 for skilled workers in sector A and to area BDG for skilled workers in sector B. The essential assumption is that skilled workers are effectively sheltered from competition through the barriers to mobility. Hence, they are not paid by their marginal product but rather receive a rent.
Now assume that the quantity of unskilled workers increases from ON 0 to ON 1 . The equilibrium wage falls to w 1 . As a consequence, the rent received by skilled workers unambiguously increases in both sectors, to ACw 1 for workers in sector A and to CF H for workers in sector B. Hence, the following result holds: the specific factor model predicts that the return to the specific factor will increase when the quantity of the unspecific factor increases. While this model does not explicitly take into account capital, the main result would hold if capital was introduced. In this case, both skilled workers and capital have to be treated as fixed factors, and they share the rent. While the shares going to skilled labor and capital are indeterminate in this model, in all but pathological cases an increase in the total available rent will benefit both fixed factors. Therefore, the main result still holds. Note, that if the increase in unskilled labor is caused by immigration, then the area IBC corresponds to the immigration surplus (Borjas, 1995) . In the Borjas model, however, the immigration surplus accrues to capitalists only, whereas here it goes to both capitalists and skilled workers.
Unfortunately, the observed positive correlation between the quantity of unskilled workers and skilled workers' wages is compatible with the rent model as well as with the competitive two-factor model under complementarity. Neither model is identified from observations on these two variables alone. That is not to say that the two models are indistinguishable. For instance, the rent model predicts that there is no employment variation for skilled workers, whereas in the competitive model, employment of skilled workers will increase as unskilled labor increases. Note, that it is the assumption of constant skilled labor in the rent model that allows us to use unskilled labor shares instead of levels; in the competitive model by contrast, the use of shares generates some potential problems (which are neglected in Zimmermann and DeNew 1994). A further difference between the two models is that only the rent model provides an unambiguous prediction for all industries. In the competitive model one might find some industries for which complementarity does not hold. In such industries, the quantity of unskilled labor will have no effect on, or even decrease, skilled workers' wages.
A rigorous test between the two hypotheses is beyond the scope of this article, and I adopt the rent approach as a maintained hypothesis. It appears to be particularly well suited at accounting for the institutional structure of the German labor market with its strong credential system and its restricted access to skilled jobs. The hypothesis to be tested is whether or not apprentices profit, and unskilled workers suffer, from an increased presence of unskilled workers in their industry.
Data and Methodology
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on individual level data on full-time work- private sector employment, firm size, and industry.
It is essential for the analysis to undertake a meaningful classification of workers into "unskilled" and "skilled" workers. I distinguish two types of skilled workers, those with a completed vocational degree, and those with a university degree. Unskilled workers are those without any skill certification. The first column of representativeness of the panel (the most important source of which is an oversampling of foreigners, or "Guestworkers"). It turns out that more than 2 out of 3 workers possess a vocational degree. The remaining third is roughly equally divided between unskilled workers and workers with university degree, with a slightly larger proportion being unskilled (ca. 16 vs. ca. 14 percent). The vast majority (76 %) of unskilled workers has foreign citizenship. There is no clearly distinguishable trend in these proportions for the observed time period.
The second column gives the mean hourly wages by skill level. For the three groups the real wage gain during the six year period varies from 9 to 11 percent. The wage differentials by skill level are rather stable. Hourly wages of workers with vocational degree exceed those of unskilled workers by around 25 percent, whereas the corresponding premium is 85 percent for university graduates. University graduates earn a premium of about 47 percent over workers with vocational degree only. The wage differentials for post-secondary degrees are somewhat smaller than the ones reported in Abraham and Houseman (1994) , which might be due to the fact that they use annual earnings and exclude female workers.
The rent model predicts that the market forces that tend to equalize unskilled workers wages in the short run are not affecting skilled workers wages. Hence, we would expect to observe a more compressed wage structure for unskilled than for skilled workers. Table 1 gives two measures of dispersion of the distribution of hourly wages, the coefficient of variation and the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile. The latter ratio varies between 2.2 for unskilled workers and 2.3-2.4 for skilled workers, either with vocational or with university degree. The increase in dispersion is more markedly traced by the coefficient of variation: The range is 0.30 -0.35 for unskilled workers, 0.37-0.41 for vocational graduates, and 0.35 -0.44 for university graduates. In the present context, it is important to note that while the wage dispersion does not vary dramatically by skill level, a slight increase can be noted for skilled as opposed to unskilled workers, an increase that conforms to the fixed/mobile factor interpretation.
Although the aggregate share of unskilled workers of ca. 16 percent displays little intertemporal variation, the industry-specific variation, both between and within industries, is much larger. The GSOEP industry classification uses 34 industries listed in the first column of Table 2 . Using the six cross sections, I can calculate for each industry and year the ratio of the number of unskilled workers to the number of all workers in that industry and year. Table 2 shows these ratios for all industries and years. Again, the original data are weighted to correct for sample selection and to obtain better estimates of the population means.
The last column of Table 2 gives an idea about the class sizes involved, taking as an example the year of 1984. The number of observed workers in each industry varies from 1 in fishing to 448 in the iron and steel industry. Clearly, the estimate of the industry specific share of unskilled labor is the more precise the more observations are available.
In the regression analysis that follows observations with industry cell occupations of 9 or less are discarded (Experiments with different minimal cell requirements did not significantly alter the results). Within the industries of 150 or more observations, the clothing trade has the highest share of unskilled workers with an average of ca. 30 percent, followed by the iron and steel industry. The industries with the smallest share of unskilled workers are education (5-12 percent), followed by health services.
Due to the relatively modest sizes of the cell populations, the standard deviations of the estimated proportions, and consequently their year to year variations, are large.
However, there are persistent industry differentials as well as discernible time trends which will allow to identify the wage effect of unskilled labor in a regression framework.
In particular, I will run standard Mincerian earnings regressions for subsamples classified by skill-level, and focus on the effect of the macro variable "share of unskilled workers" by identifying the individual's industry affiliation and merging in the corresponding share. To give the estimated coefficient of the "unskilled share" any meaningful interpretation, several considerations have to be taken into account. Firstly, individual wages might be affected by unobservables which are correlated with the in-dustry affiliation. I will use a random effects model with individual specific effect u i to account for this problem:
where w it is the log of the hourly wage for individual I at time t, x it is a set of covariates, E(u 2 i ) = σ 2 u and E(u i ε it ) = 0. I estimate the model with LIMDEP, using an unbalanced panel design. I did reject a fixed effects specification on a-priori grounds, since I want to measure the effect of variables that do not vary over time.
Secondly, industries differ in technology. For instance, industries with low capital intensity might have both a large share of unskilled workers and low skilled workers' wages. Since I want to isolate the effect of an increase in unskilled labor on wages, ceteris paribus, it is necessary to control for industry specific effects through industry dummies. Unfortunately, LIMDEP has a hard coded limitation which restricts the size of the product of the number of group means and the number of regressors (Greene 1992 ). This forced me to aggregate some industries so that in the end, I use 20 industry dummies.
Thirdly, the industry share of unskilled workers may be endogenous and thus correlated with the error term. If the supply of skilled labor is fixed in the short run, then industry specific demand shocks will lead to contemporaneous and equi-directed adjustments in both skilled workers wages and shares of unskilled workers. Therefore, I also perform instrumented regressions, where the actual unskilled share is replaced by a predicted share. The auxiliary regression for predicting the share uses the full sample and includes industry dummies (34), industry dummies interacted with the aggregate share of unskilled workers (which postulates that an exogenous increase in unskilled labor is evenly spread over the industries), and the lagged share of unskilled workers.
The auxiliary regression has an R 2 of 0.825. The results are reported with and without instrumentation.
Fourthly, there is a potential problem of measurement error in the share variable I use.
The variable is constructed from the GSOEP and mostly based on small to moderate sample sizes. While I do correct for non-representativeness by applying sample weights provided in the data set, the sampling error is still large. One alternative would be to use external information as provided for instance in publications by the Statistisches Bundesamt. Unfortunately, there exist no published data that match my definition of skilled and unskilled labor, that is, educational attainment rather than current status.
To keep the measurements consistent, I have to use the constructed share variable. As to the implicit measurement problem, I refer to Fuller (1987) who shows that the t-test of a regression coefficient is unbiased in the presence of measurement error, as long as the maintained hypothesis is β = 0. While measurement error reduces the power of the test, this does not invalidate my analysis. To the contrary, rejection of the null hypothesis provides strong indication for the link between unskilled labor and skilled workers' wages.
Results
Separate regressions were run for 5 samples: (1) workers with vocational degree; (2) workers with apprenticeship degree; (3) workers with an apprenticeship in industry and trade; (4) workers with university degree; and (5) unskilled workers. The German system of vocational training distinguishes two types of institutions: (full-time) vocational schools and apprenticeships. For ca. 60 percent of workers with vocational degree, the apprenticeship degree is the only vocational degree. While the first sample contains workers with any type of vocational degree, the second sample includes workers with apprenticeship degree only.
The third sample forms a subsample of the apprenticeship sample. It contains apprentices in vocations that are generally considered to be of higher quality. The German apprenticeship system is organized by training sectors running across industries, the most important of which are the crafts sector and the industry and trade sector. On average, the latter provides higher quality apprenticeships in terms of human capital investment, skill content, and advancement opportunities (Soskice 1994) . Thus, it is for these apprentices that one would expect the rent model to apply most clearly. Unfortunately, the GSOEP does not contain direct information on the training sector. I use indirect information given by white collar status in the current employment, assuming that there is a (close) positive correlation between a high quality apprenticeship outside the crafts sector and current white collar status. Given the data limitation, this appears to be a reasonable way to discriminate between low and high quality apprenticeships.
The regression results are given in Tables 3a and 3b In particular, the effects of the standard human capital variables schooling, experience and experience squared have the expected signs and are comparable in magnitude to the effects found in previous studies for Germany. The estimated return for one additional year of schooling varies between 7% for unskilled workers and 10% for apprentices. The experience-earnings profile is concave with a maximum between 30 and 35 years of experience. There is a persistent gender wage differential which is smallest for university graduates (10%) and largest for unskilled workers (22%). The wage discount for public sector employment increases with skill level. While there is no wage differential for unskilled workers, workers with vocational degree earn 4% less, and university graduates 15% less, if employed in the public sector. This negative effect, which has been paid little attention to in the previous literature, might reflect a compensating wage differential for job security.
The coefficients for firm size repeat the well established evidence for higher pay in larger firms (Schmidt and Zimmermann, 1991) . This result is compatible with efficiency wage arguments according to which larger firms have bigger incentives to overpay since they face larger monitoring costs. The effect of nationality on wages is not clear cut. While
Germans with university degree earn more than their non-German counterparts, German apprentices and unskilled workers earn less. The effect for workers with vocational degree is insignificant. Given the aforementioned heterogeneity of the group of foreigners that includes both immigrants and second generation foreigners, these inconclusive results do not come as a surprise.
Next, I turn to a discussion of the effects of unskilled labor in one's industry. For workers with vocational degree, the industry share of unskilled workers is statistically significant and negative. To assess the economic importance I will throughout this discussion refer to the predicted effects of a 10 percentage points increase of the industry share of unskilled workers, i.e. an increase from 10 to 20 percent, or from 30 to 40 percent. Such an increase will lower the wages of workers with vocational degree by one to three percent, depending on whether one uses the uninstrumented or the instrumented regression (Table 3a) . A significantly negative effect of similar magnitude is observed for the subgroup of workers with apprenticeship degree. However, no effect, either positive or negative, can be found for the subgroup of apprentices in industry and trade, i.e. for workers with a high-quality apprenticeship. Table 3b shows that workers with university degree definitely profit from the presence of unskilled workers in their industry. A ten percentage points increase will increase their wages by a sizable four to five percent. The same increase in the share of unskilled workers will reduce unskilled workers' wages by two to three percent. It is worthwhile to note that the proportion of explained variation to the total variation in wages is very similar across models varying from 30 to 36 % (except for the industry and trade sub-sample). The somewhat higher variation in wages observed for skilled workers can thus be, at least partially, explained by the regression function, rather than entering the residual.
Discussion
The rent model predicts that skilled workers' wages increase and unskilled workers'
wages decrease as the industry share of unskilled workers increases. While heterogeneities in vocational degrees are a potential problem, the finding of a negative wage effect does uphold for the subgroup of apprentices. Only when restricting the sample to apprentices in industry and trade (that is workers with current white collar status) could no negative effect be detected. However, there is also no evidence for a positive effect predicted by the specificity of skilled work. The wages of university graduates, in contrast, do in fact profit: a 10 percentage point increase of the share of unskilled workers leads to a four to five percent wage increase. Workers with university degree receive a rent.
The initially pronounced hypothesis, that the apprenticeship system might have found indirect support by a contemporaneous inflow of unskilled workers through immigration, is not supported by this empirical analysis, and further work is needed to study the position of workers with vocational degree. Such work could exploit information on regional variation in the share of unskilled workers (which is not possible with the Public Use SOEP version), or establishment data as in Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1994a) .
Finally, I want to point out the implications of my findings for the literature on native wage impact of immigration. For a "worst case scenario", assume that immigration is completely unskilled (I noted before that most of the unskilled workers in the German labor market are foreigners). Such immigration will hurt unskilled workers (both native and foreign) in Germany since these workers face the direct competition of immigrants.
Workers with university degree are effectively shielded from the competition, and they can reap a rent. The situation for workers with apprenticeship degree, the bulk of the work force, is not clear cut. While I find wage effects that are statistically significant, they are much smaller than the ones found in DeNew and Zimmermann (1994) in a study comparing blue and white collar workers. The overall effect of, say, a one percentage point increase in the foreigner share is a reduction of native wages by less than a quarter of a percent. This minimal and economically insignificant native wage impact is, as theory tells us, likely to be more than offset by gains to capital owners. 
